Doctoral dissertation henry babcock veatch logicsecond force confronting the statesman centers on policy “harmonizing with the national experience, which is a problem of historical development” (kissinger 2013, 326). the time he enrolled in harvard’s doctoral program, kissinger had already been a refugee fleeing the horrors of nazi germany, had served in the u. extent of kissinger's involvement in or support of these plans is a subject of controversy. “only a shallow historicism would maintain that successful policies are always possible,” wrote kissinger in his first book (kissinger 2013, 322). 1957 kissinger published nuclear weapons and foreign policy, which proposed a flexible defense posture, including provision for "limited warfare" and the strategic employment of nuclear weapons as an alternative to the doctrine of "massive retaliation" against direct foreign aggression, which dominated military thinking during the mid-1950s. kissinger explains:Why not attempt to adapt the austrian domestic structure to the national élan sweeping across europe?" conrad black agreed that there is "no evidence" connecting kissinger, who was "playing a fairly innocuous double game of self-promotion", with attempts to undermine the peace talks. second force confronting the statesman centers on policy “harmonizing with the national experience, which is a problem of historical development” (kissinger 2013, 326). kissinger, a world restored: metternich, castlereagh and the problems of peace, 1812-1822 (1957). the ultimate “test of a statesman, then, is his ability to recognize the real relationship of forces and to make this knowledge serve his ends” (kissinger 2013, 325). it is this view that opened kissinger up to some criticism. all the emphasis placed on the realpolitik concerning the peace settlement and the maneuvering of the various forces there is an even greater aspect to the book that most of the reviewers seem to overlook, namely kissinger’s dissemination of conservative philosophy., as political scientist francis fukuyama explains, kissinger was “…always conscious of the fact that foreign policy was made by statesmen who operated in a specific historical, cultural, and political context that shaped their goals and limited their options” (fukuyama 1997). kissinger suggests that it is not so much that talleyrand was a major political power broker, but rather that he occupied a key position as the delegate for the house of bourbon—the envoy of the restored monarch. the first is “the problem of legitimizing a policy within a governmental apparatus;” an issue kissinger calls a “problem of bureaucratic rationality” (kissinger 2013, 326). a misbalance of forces could undermine stability, threats from a revolutionary state capitalizing on this disequilibrium to challenge a world order’s legitimacy most concerned kissinger. about a quarter of the city’s population was jewish; washington heights, where the kissingers settled, was a comfortable, middle-class jewish community. kissinger is quite clear:‘legitimacy’ as here used should not be confused with justice. in many ways this book reads more like a tribute than a historical narrative, but with the body of evidence presented, kissinger’s claims are not unwarranted. i think, however, that kissinger truly understands the politics of the period. although reagan narrowly lost that primary to ford, due to the immense advantage of incumbency for ford, reagan won a landslide victory four years later on a platform that repudiated kissinger's polices. kissinger met secretly with north vietnamese leaders in paris from 1969 on, finally concluding a cease-fire in january 1973, for which he and chief north vietnamese negotiator le duc tho were awarded the 1973 nobel peace prize. it is this view that opened kissinger up to some criticism. following this the essay digs into the most important themes presented in restored, first using historian niell ferguson’s official biography of kissinger as a guide, and then striking out independently. the army, kissinger was informally tutored by fritz kraemer, a fellow refugee with two phd's. kissinger maintains that history instructs today’s policymakers not through scientific laws or identities, but rather through analogies that might serve as guides for addressing modern policy problems (kissinger 2013, 331). still, the two men shared similar visions for the role of diplomacy, and kissinger saw metternich’s role during the congress of vienna and after as essential. of the ultimate settlement in vienna, the harvard scholar reflected:…what is surprising is not how imperfect was the settlement that emerged, but how sane… it may not have fulfilled all hopes in an idealistic generation, but it gave this generation something perhaps more precious: a period of stability which permitted their hopes to be realized without a major war or a permanent revolution (kissinger 2015, 5). kissinger does recognize, very perceptively, that austria needed to preserve the hapsburg monarchy by restoring the “old guard” of europe. later analysts would associate this intertwining of talking and fighting (or at least willingness to fight) with kissinger’s tenure in the white house and state department (kaplan 1999). is this concept of conservativism that kissinger carried with him through life. instead nixon and kissinger sought to downsize america's global commitments in proportion to its reduced economic, moral and political power. if students of strategy and diplomacy read one book on henry kissinger, this should be it. a revolutionary power, according to the young scholar, was one that could never be reassured of its security and that consequently sought to guarantee absolute security at the expense of others in the system (kissinger 2013, 2). the dissertation turned book “laid the foundation for his philosophy of realpolitik and the conservative outlook that endured throughout his career” (isaacson 1992, 75). to begin with, kissinger held a “distinctly old-fashioned view of history as an essentially tragic discipline” (ferguson 2015, 299).
Henry A. Kissinger Predoctoral Fellowship”) so kissinger outsourced the lightheartedness, letting the dog do the work. early in his adult life, kissinger seemed to understand that he was perceived as boring. kissinger, a world restored: metternich, castlereagh and the problems of peace, 1812-1822 (1957). while several of his peers at harvard had also served, few had the first-hand experience of persecution that kissinger brought with him from his earlier years. chapter 9, “doctor kissinger,” discusses a world restored at length and is the very best summary of the book available. the opening section offers a brief introduction to henry kissinger as both a statesman and scholar. he ardently believed that by looking back into the past it might be possible to see how historical analogy could be used to help guide policies of the modern age (kissinger 2013, 331). it implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that, like germany after the treaty of versailles [ending world war i], it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign policy (kissinger 2013, 1). while force is necessary to underpin diplomacy, its practice is essentially “… the art of relating states to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force” (kissinger 2013, 326). to begin with, kissinger held a “distinctly old-fashioned view of history as an essentially tragic discipline” (ferguson 2015, 299). of the ultimate settlement in vienna, the harvard scholar reflected:…what is surprising is not how imperfect was the settlement that emerged, but how sane… it may not have fulfilled all hopes in an idealistic generation, but it gave this generation something perhaps more precious: a period of stability which permitted their hopes to be realized without a major war or a permanent revolution (kissinger 2015, 5).”kissinger’s journey from refugee escaping nazi germany to secretary of state is an astonishing one, but it is also a tale that is extremely well known in its broad outline. isaacson suggests that while kissinger displays metternich’s flaws throughout restored, he pays him “tribute” for the diplomatic and negotiation skills he mustered during his life (isaacson 1992, 77).↑ evelyn goh, "nixon, kissinger, and the 'soviet card' in the u. careful readers of history learn that these were “men marked by individuality” that made all the difference in achieving and maintaining a stable international system (kissinger 2013, 316). he holds that much of kissinger’s work overlooks the interests and role of great britain in the vienna peace process. kissinger contends:…if a society legitimizes itself by a principle which claims both universality and exclusiveness, if its concept of ‘justice,’ in short, does not include the existence of different principles of legitimacy, relations between it and other societies will come to be based on force (kissinger 2013, 328). are times when kissinger gives insight into the nature of the peace settlement that in many ways takes a diplomat of his standing—although the book is written before his diplomatic ascension—to comprehend the situation. kissinger's realism fell out of fashion as idealism returned to american foreign policy with carter's moralism emphasizing human rights, and reagan's rollback strategy aimed at destroying communism. the website has a detailed biography of kissinger’s political life, and also a selected bibliography of his academic writings. kissinger, the college authorities concluded, may have been suffering from shellshock; the dog might be the only thing keeping him out of the sanatorium. the first is “the problem of legitimizing a policy within a governmental apparatus;” an issue kissinger calls a “problem of bureaucratic rationality” (kissinger 2013, 326). kaplan suggests that “the book's principal character, the austrian diplomat prince clemens von metternich -- secretive, manipulative, and tragic in his world view -- is often seen as the figure kissinger took as a model. the dissertation on which a world restored ultimately earned harvard’s sumner prize and was regarded by at least a number of faculty and scholars as first-rate work, even if several suggested he was far too enamored with austrian prince metternich’s successes (ferguson 2015, 311).”in order to answer that question, kissinger would be thrown together with richard nixon and his “gang of self-seeking bastards. although president ford repeatedly reached out to the cubans; their military interventions in angola, mozambique, and ethiopia destroyed kissinger's hopes. still, the two men shared similar visions for the role of diplomacy, and kissinger saw metternich’s role during the congress of vienna and after as essential. and in that sense there is genuine belief in the practice of diplomacy, which kissinger holds as the key stability in post-napoleonic europe." he has also condemned kissinger's business ties with indonesia, arguing that they influenced the us "tilt" in favor of suharto during the war in east timor. perhaps the most valuable is kissinger’s analysis of the importance that individual personality plays in the conduct of foreign policy. “kissinger's depictions of metternich, castlereagh, and talleyrand reflect that consciousness and an attuned sensitivity to the nuances of character,” writes fukuyama (fukuyama 1997). ferguson’s books, this was the most commonly read kissinger biography. argument about legitimacy and stability evolved directly from kissinger studying the congress of vienna. to commentary, however, regardless of what they said in the aftermath (quoting from the nixon tapes):"kissinger seems to have been unaware of the plot. later rumors to the effect that kissinger knew the south vietnamese government was too weak to survive long were wrong; kissinger and nixon had built south vietnam into one of the strongest militaries in asia—much stronger than the north vietnamese—and they had stripped away much of hanoi's support from moscow and beijing. the wake of the 2008-9 financial crisis, kissinger wrote:A major cause of the crisis has been the gap between the economic and the political organization of the world.
henry kissinger and the american century (2007), intellectual biography focused on pre-1969.” what characterizes kissinger for his biographer is that at every stage—from fleeing germany as a refugee, discovering the horror of the holocaust, learning about history itself at harvard, and developing a political ability to “project beyond the known” as an action-intellectual—kissinger “learned something new about the nature of foreign policy, cumulatively building an understanding of international relations that, by the end of the 1960s, had few rivals. like clausewitz who argued for the matching of military strategies with political goals, kissinger reminds us that the diplomat may only maneuver within the space outlined by the policies of his or her government and aim to deploy a diplomatic strategy in support of such policies. when in 1968, with nixon forming his administration, kissinger asked bundy for advice, the former dean could not believe that they were talking about anything more substantive than an assistant secretaryship. this view may have characterized the dissertation turned book at the time of its writing but today restored is widely regarded as essential reading for the student of strategy and diplomacy. kissinger, who had acquired smoky on a whim while on active service in europe during world war ii, had asked his girlfriend to arrange the dog’s flight back to the united states, and he sent detailed instructions to his parents about how to look after the animal (“don’t ever beat him. this is not surprising given the period, but kissinger fails to recognize that with the overthrow of an autocratic ruler it is likely that there will be no middle ground. goes on to on to link stability and legitimacy with the use of force and the role of diplomacy:Their [the diplomats in vienna] goal was stability, not perfection, and the balance of power is the classic expression of the lesson of history that no order is safe without physical safeguards against aggression… there was created a balance of forces which, because it conferred a relative security, came to be generally accepted, and whose relationships grew increasingly spontaneous as its legitimacy came to be taken for granted (kissinger 2013, 317 – 318). fukuyama in this brief piece highlights kissinger’s major arguments in a world restored and offers useful criticism as well. second, kissinger envisioned a specific role for the united states in the modern international system – the same role great britain filled throughout the 19th century – that of “offshore balancing power” (ferguson 2015, 301)." william bundy stated that kissinger obtained "no useful inside information" from his trip to paris, and "almost any experienced hanoi watcher might have come to the same conclusion". present day students of strategy and diplomacy will likely find more in common between kissinger’s writing style and that of the 19th century thinkers he studied, than they will contemporary social scientists or even historians. he ardently believed that by looking back into the past it might be possible to see how historical analogy could be used to help guide policies of the modern age (kissinger 2013, 331). “the statesman,” writes kissinger in restored, “is therefore like one of the heroes in a classical drama who has had a vision of the future but who cannot transmit it directly to his fellow-men and who cannot validate its ‘truth’. a world restored metternich, castlereagh and the problem of peace, 1812-1822, his first book, was written in the early 1950s while kissinger was a young doctoral student at harvard. "the kissinger commission on population and development in central america," population and development review, vol. still, for all the puzzlement his dissertation stirred and for all his intellectual arrogance and grand ambitions, kissinger’s peers recognized his special intellect and often found themselves admiring the dogged student despite themselves (isaacson 1992, 78 – 80). additionally, the wise statesman “must be prepared for the worst contingency” and never rely on the “goodwill” of another state or the “moral purity” of the individual leading it (kissinger 2013, 316). neither was interested in economics, and only nixon mastered the nitty gritty of politics and elections, while only kissinger understood nuclear strategy. when he did graduate, kissinger was already thirty-one years of age and a good deal more experienced than many donning a cap and gown in the spring of 1954. in many ways kissinger’s writing was that of a contrarian, bucking the trends in modern political science and the academy as a whole. world restored was a young but somber kissinger’s answer not just to understanding the napoleonic era’s end but also applying that history to the present. to combat this dangerous expansionism, kissinger closely aligned the united states with anti-communist nations in the area, such as suharto's indonesia, which was once described as the greatest prize in asia., there is a great deal of speculation about the role these historical figures played in the life henry kissinger beyond his dissertation. isaacson suggests that while kissinger displays metternich’s flaws throughout restored, he pays him “tribute” for the diplomatic and negotiation skills he mustered during his life (isaacson 1992, 77). his life, kissinger has enjoyed long-standing friendships with such notables as katherine graham, walt wriston, beverly sills, bill paley, hans morgenthau, fritz kraemer, ahmet ertegun, sir james goldsmith, marion dönhoff, gianni agnelli, john aspinall, rudolf augstein, arthur m.” indeed, more often than not, kissinger seemed “indifferent to his own career prospects. if there were concerns that jewish immigrants, even reasonably wealthy ones, were living in new “ghettos,” the experience of fighting the second world war soon changed that for kissinger and his generation. Bradley Potter, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Henry Kissinger is an icon within the American foreign policy community, but that was not always the case. he concludes that “kissinger set out simultaneously an idealist methodology, a conservative ideology, a philosophy of history, and a tragic sensibility” with his book (ferguson 2015, 300). "kissinger: 1973, the crucial year" (2009); one of the best books on the man. conrad black has praised kissinger as "a political memoirist surpassed, if at all, only by winston churchill and charles de gaulle. the time he enrolled in harvard’s doctoral program, kissinger had already been a refugee fleeing the horrors of nazi germany, had served in the u. no, in 1954, while putting the finishing touches on his dissertation, henry kissinger was like many doctoral candidates, preoccupied with gaining what he hoped would be his first academic appointment (ferguson 2015, 324 – 327). while kissinger’s dissertation may have seemed out of place to peers, looking back at the book from these perspectives shows the full magnitude of its importance as scholarship and as a study of its author. the british historian identifies four contrarian themes within the book’s pages that distill not just kissinger’s intellectual development and approach to statecraft but also explore his analysis of the 19th century “long peace.
for “what kissinger had yet to learn was the answer to kraemer’s—and his own—most difficult questions. as tens of thousands fled a communist take-over in the small island of east timor under horrible conditions following a civil war that resulted in the death or displacement of 9,000 individuals; ford and kissinger gave suharto their approval to annex east timor and remove the soviet-backed communist government. kissinger, a world restored: metternich, castlereagh and the problems of peace, 1812-1822 (1957). “the statesman,” writes kissinger in restored, “is therefore like one of the heroes in a classical drama who has had a vision of the future but who cannot transmit it directly to his fellow-men and who cannot validate its ‘truth’. webster’s review seems to suggest as much, but the particular interest leads one to see metternich as kissinger’s role model. his long study of metternich and castlereagh must have affected kissinger’s development as a policymaker, but what his dissertation really offered him was a laboratory to explore how these practitioners engaged in foreign policy realism. september 16, 1973, the following exchange about the coup took place between kissinger and president nixon:Nixon: nothing new of any importance or is there? his undergraduate thesis, portentously called “the meaning of history,” at 388 pages, was so long that it prompted the introduction of maximum word limit that even today is still known as the kissinger rule. kissinger, a world restored: metternich, castlereagh and the problems of peace, 1812-1822 (1957). while force is necessary to underpin diplomacy, its practice is essentially “… the art of relating states to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force” (kissinger 2013, 326). kissinger understood that fact implicitly, embraced it even, and used it as a protective barrier against xenophobia and anti-semitism. that common perception of a scheming machiavellian character willing to sell anything and anyone down the river to further his own cause is one element of the subtle corrective that niall ferguson offers in this biography of kissinger “the idealist. "covert action should not be confused with missionary work," kissinger famously declared. fukuyama in this brief piece highlights kissinger’s major arguments in a world restored and offers useful criticism as well. nixon and kissinger: partners in power (2007) excerpt and text search, dual biography by leading scholar; hostile. many of his peers and the harvard intelligentsia opined that his work was “outdated” and featured analysis of politicians whose roles in history were well understood, though this did not bother kissinger (ferguson 2015, 304; isaacson 1992, 75). almost overnight, writes ferguson, “kissinger would be one of the foremost american experts on nuclear strategy, a best-selling author, a star guest on television talk shows, the subject of debate in washington, and the object of denunciation in moscow. desiring to ensure great britain was not threatened by a continental europe under the command of a single power, castlereagh used the negotiations in vienna to engineer a system for balancing forces through the quadruple alliance (kissinger, 2013, 5-6). for instance, ferguson argues that kissinger saw the seeds of europe’s great war were planted at the congress of vienna (ferguson 2015, 298). rather, it was the kind of dissertation whose findings might help mold the mind of a man who would become a future practitioner, a subtle difference. such a state sees the existing international order or legitimization of it as oppressive; it will never have peaceful relations with the powers party to that order (kissinger 2013, 2). reagan's analysis proved correct and ford was forced to reduce kissinger's role, taking away in 1975 kissinger's double role as national security advisor. while kissinger’s dissertation may have seemed out of place to peers, looking back at the book from these perspectives shows the full magnitude of its importance as scholarship and as a study of its author." harlow and henry kissinger (who was friendly with both campaigns and guaranteed a job in either a humphrey or nixon administration) separately predicted johnson's "bombing halt": "the word is out that we are making an effort to throw the election to humphrey. as kissinger points out, in 1813 there were two choices: a war for liberation led by the people in which royal legitimacy would have been void; or a war of states in which metternich could substantiate the austrian monarchy as the legitimate premier power (47). to be sure, these men faced the limitations imposed on them by their respective states, but they rose to the occasion and forged a system with lasting implications for european politics (kissinger 2013, 5). additionally, the dissertation was light on primary sources, generally a hallmark of doctoral work expected to break fresh scholarly ground (isaacson 1992, 76). the dissertation turned book “laid the foundation for his philosophy of realpolitik and the conservative outlook that endured throughout his career” (isaacson 1992, 75). when the cia learned about the chilean plan to set up a covert office in miami as part of chile's overseas operations in 1974, however, kissinger did authorize the cia to send the chilean directorate of national intelligence (dina) a warning not to go ahead with the plan. kissinger is an icon within the american foreign policy community, but that was not always the case. a phd dissertation on castlereagh and metternich followed that was published three years later as a world restored. furthermore, “it was equally natural,” kissinger maintains, “that [ france] should attempt to construct a group of powers as a wedge to break up the coalition” (148).. webster, the venerable biographer of castlereagh, in a less than friendly review of kissinger’s work, states that “metternich with deeper insight wished to prevent a social revolution in europe” (167). second, the book may be viewed as an important milestone in the development of kissinger as a foreign policy thinker. kissinger argues that the “achievements” of diplomacy hinge on its objectives, “which are defined outside the sphere of diplomacy and which diplomacy must treat at given” (kissinger 2013, 322). kissinger writes:For this reason an international settlement which is accepted and not imposed will always appear somewhat unjust to any one of its components…because were any one power totally satisfied, all others would have to be totally dissatisfied.